Une coalition d’ONG et d’avocats a porté plainte contre Israël

Since the inconclusive Second Lebanon War of 2006, the Israeli army has been developing tactics and adding equipment and capabilities to fight more effectively in asymmetric conflicts. The recent success of “Operation Cast Lead” in the densely populated Gaza Strip shows that an industrial military that coordinates operations among land, air and sea units, makes effective use of advanced technology, and shares intelligence and leads from the front can decisively defeat an asymmetric enemy.

In this 22-day battle (Dec. 27, 2008-Jan. 18) the asymmetric enemy was, of course, Hamas, a militant group of fundamentalists that controls the Gaza Strip and has been launching crude but deadly rockets into Israel for years. Israel’s stated goal was to stop the rocket offensive. Before it could do that, forces had to fight decisively on urban battlefields that were full of traps.

Since taking over Gaza two years ago, Hamas has turned the area into a fortress. Weapon and ammunition depots were everywhere—even in mosques. Israeli intelligence pinpointed more than six mosques in Gaza City that were ar­senals, a fact confirmed by huge secondary explosions after they were attacked.

Underground shelters, some built into fortified but occupied homes, were used to hide hundreds of rockets that Hamas planned to launch against Israel. Almost every apartment building in the suburbs was boobytrapped or held arms caches rigged to be set off by explosives if Israeli soldiers entered. Many streets and alleyways concealed a labyrinth of bunkers and tunnels, also boobytrapped.

Israel used a variety of tactics   to outflank and defeat Hamas in its own territory. These included long-term planning, meticulous intelligence-gathering,  deception and disinformation.  Although the attack had been prepared for weeks, operational security and a well-planned deception campaign  took Hamas by surprise when it finally happened,  despite Israel’s repeated warnings  that the rocket attacks  would trigger a war.

Operation Cast Lead began with devastating air strikes. The Israel Air Force (IAF) hammered targets in the Gaza Strip with jets and helicopters.

Prime targets were the Rafah tunnels under the Egyptian border, through which Hamas smuggled weapons and money, much of it from Iran (DTI February, p. 43). The IAF used sophisticated weapons including earth-penetrating bombs to destroy the “tunnel city.”

Among those weapons was the new PB500A1 from Israel Military Industries, a laser-guided hard-target penetration bomb based on the 1,000-lb. Mk-83 “dumb” bomb. It is reportedly capable of penetrating 2 meters (6.5 ft.) of reinforced concrete. Unconfirmed reports claim the IAF used Boeing’s GBU-39 small-diameter bomb for the first time. High-precision weapons were also deployed throughout the battle to destroy bunkers and weapon depots.

Following a week of precision bombing,  the ground campaign opened with three infantry brigade task forces simultaneously entering the Gaza Strip  from several directions.  Four brigade commanders, all colonels,  fought on the front lines with their troops  throughout the two-week ground offensive  in the northern Gaza Strip:  Herzi Levy of the paratroopers brigade; Avi Peled of the Golani brigade;  Ilan Malka of the Givati brigade;  and Yigal Slovick of the 401st armored brigade.

The infantry brigades  approached their objectives  from unexpected directions,  avoiding previously used routes in which Hamas created boobytrapped bunkers and tunnels. Slovick’s armored brigade, fielding the latest Merkava Mk4 main battle tank,  raced unopposed to block access from Rafah and Khan Yunis  to Gaza City, cutting supply lines to Hamas from the south.

Cast Lead was the first Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation in which unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters and fighter jets  were allocated to ground forces directly  without IAF central command authorizing sorties.  This went even further, with air-support controller teams  operating alongside brigade commanders at the front,  passing along whatever surveillance data from UAVs  and other assets they needed.

Each brigade combat team  was assigned a UAV squadron  for close support,  with ground-control operators at forward headquarters  calling in air strikes  from standby attack helicopters and,  if necessary,  identifying targets to fixed-wing assets cruising over the combat zone.  Aerial surveillance from Heron and Hermes 450 UAVs and Apache attack helicopters provided an unprecedented level of real-time close air support  in response to time-critical targets. A high degree of situational awareness was achieved by maintaining at least a dozen UAVs in flight over Gaza at all times. These aircraft saved the lives of Israeli soldiers and civilians by detecting Hamas ambushes and rocket launch sites and directing aircraft, tanks and artillery to the targets.

Another first that reduced casualties  was the unprecedented level of interservice cooperation between IDF land forces and Israel’s internal security agency (ISA).  This was evident in command posts as well as on the battlefield. ISA operatives attached to forward units  assisted in gathering information and intelligence from the field  and rapidly turning it into targeting data for strikes against time-critical targets.

Precision attacks  were initiated by aircraft,  ground elements like snipers and tanks  and by Spike LR (long-range) antiarmor missiles  modified with antistructure warheads.  Using UAVs and sophisticated electronics,  the fusion of intelligence-gathering capabilities  was able to pinpoint explosive caches and boobytraps  and provide troops with real-time intelligence.

This cooperation substantially shortened the sensor-to-shooter cycle. During Operation Cast Lead, intelligence sources say that F-15 and F-16 aircraft  could identify and fire air-to-ground missiles  within 30 sec. of data transmission  to take out fleeing targets.

The Israeli navy  attacked Hamas coastal targets and boats.  Records of the attacks published by the navy indicate  that for the first time  vessels are equipped with Rafael’s Spike ER electro-optically guided missiles.  Two of these were shown on Israeli TV.  The Spike ER missiles,  with a range of 8 km. (5 mi.),  have been fired from helicopters,  land vehicles and ground positions,  and are now employed on gunboats,  most likely Super Dvora fast-attack craft  with Rafael’s Typhoon stabilized gun mount.  Videos of an attack showed precision hits from the boat’s Typhoon gun  despite a rolling sea.

The army anticipated high casualties in attacks  on the fortified refugee camps. To deal with this, a senior medical officer says the IDF reduced the aerial evacuation time of wounded soldiers  from the Gaza Strip by more than 50% from the Second Lebanon War, to 45 min. on average.  In many cases evacuation was done under fire,  with helicopter pilots landing within combat zones. The IDF medical corps  has been using new state-of-the-art equipment  to treat wounds. One device added to field units is QuikClot Combat Gauze from Z-Medica Corp. of Wallingford, Conn., which uses a hemostatic coagulant to stop bleeding.

One life-saving element  was the elite Yahalom (diamond) combat engineering unit,  which faced a challenging task in defeating efforts by Hamas to capture Israeli soldiers.  Hamas dug tunnels in boobytrapped houses  to kidnap soldiers for use as bargaining chips. Yahalom soldiers were dispersed throughout the brigades and battalions  and armed with new equipment and weapons  that received their first operational use during the fighting.  These included miniature robots like Elbit Systems’ VIPeR,  and wall-breaching munitions  like Simon and Matador,  which became indispensable for troops fighting through booby-trapped b

un Juif israélien violera une Palos quand ça lui plaira dit Yéhoudi

Pour attraper une schtouille paloide verminae, non ! non ! merci

Commentaire n°33 posté par Aschkel le 20/03/2009 à 08h35